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THE PERILS OF COURTROOM STORIES
Stephan Landsman*
THE CRIME

OF SHEILA MCGOUGH. By Janet Malcolm. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf. 1999. Pp. 161. $22.
I.

ONCE UPON A TIME-THE ALLEGEDLY SAD TALE
OF SHEILA MCGOUGH

As Janet Malcolm1 tells it, Sheila McGough was a middle-aged sin
gle woman living at home with her parents and working as an editor
and administrator in the publications department of the Carnegie
Institute when she decided to switch careers and go to law school. She
applied and was admitted to the then recently accredited law school at
George Mason University. After graduation, she began a solo prac
tice in northern Virginia that involved a significant amount of state
appointed criminal defense work.
In 1986, approximately four years after her graduation from law
school, McGough received a call requesting assistance from an incar
cerated arrestee named Bob Bailes. From the very start, McGough's
assistance to Bailes was unorthodox. Immediately upon meeting him
at the Fairfax County, Virginia, lockup, she decided that his apparent
poor health warranted her taking the unusual step of personally sign
ing as guarantor for his bail. McGough said of this decision:

What I did was something lawyers never, never do. I didn't go out of my
way to tell anybody I had done that. It was just so unprofessional . . . . I
would not have committed crimes for my clients. But anything that was
just risking my time and my money - if I had it - I would not hesitate
to do. [p. 34]

* Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University
College of Law. B.A. 1969, Kenyon; J.D. 1972, Harvard. -Ed.

1. Janet Malcolm is a Czech-born American journalist whose parents fled their home
land when she was four, in 1939. She has, for many years, been one of the leading writers on
the staff of The New Yorker magazine. A series of her articles have been turned into pro
vocative and high-profile books. These have included her volume about Freudian psychiatry
and the iconoclastic psychiatrist, Jeffrey Masson, entitled IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES (1984);
her sharply critical assessment of the work of journalist Joe McGinniss regarding the case of
convicted murderer, Jeffrey MacDonald, entitled THE JOURNALIST AND TIIE MUR DERER
(1990); and her biography of the marriage of Sylvia Plafu and Ted Hughes, entitled THE
SILENTWOMAN (1995).
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McGough thereafter began preparing to represent Bailes at his up
coming federal court trial2 on charges that he had provided false in
formation to secure a bank loan and used a false social security num
ber in that transaction.
While Bailes was awaiting trial, he conducted a number of business
transactions out of McGough's office. These involved negotiations to
sell certain allegedly still valid nineteenth-century insurance company
charters that were claimed to excuse the holder from the constraints of
state regulation or review.3 On June 18, 1986, two men named Frank
Manfredi and Francis Boccagna agreed, through their attorney, Alan
Morris, to buy two of the charters for $900,000 each with a down pay
ment of $75,000 for both. They were not really the principals in this
deal but were "brokers"4 for an investment banker named Kirkpatrick
MacDonald. The down payment was wired into Sheila McGough's at
torney trust account. McGough immediately drew the funds out of
that account, transferring $70,000 to Bailes and keeping $5,000 for
herself. Although Malcolm does not explore the matter in detail,
other transactions involving the sale of charters also took place at
around the same time.
In the late summer of 1986, Bailes, represented by McGough, went
on trial in the bank fraud case. He was convicted and sentenced to
five years in federal prison.5 The story, however, was far from over.
McGough redoubled her efforts on Bailes's behalf. She sought his
release from prison by a variety of means. These included what one
federal district judge found to be a frivolous attack on the sentence
imposed upon Bailes6 as well as the instigation of a bankruptcy pro
ceeding. In the bankruptcy action, one set of corporations owned by
Bailes sought bankruptcy protection while another set of his shell
companies requested that the court release him from prison so he
could facilitate the payment of their alleged claims. Although it would
appear these claims were nothing but shams, McGough worked tire
lessly to effectuate the scheme.

2. The trial was to be held in the late summer of 1986.
3. A lawyer who represented McGough, later described these charters to Malcolm in
the following terms: "These guys were buying insurance charters that gave them the right to
sell insurance without reserves. That's like printing money. What are they talking about?"
P. 72.
4. This is the term used by Judge Richard Posner to describe Manfredi and Boccagna in
his review of Malcolm's book. See Richard Posner, In the Fraud Archives, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 19, 1999, at29.
5. See United States v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that the defendant
used several aliases, including "Bob Bailes" - the name Malcolm uses throughout her
book).
6. The federal judge who heard this challenge to the sentence, Judge James Turk, was so
incensed by its frivolity that he threatened McGough with sanctions for pressing it. Pp. 2933.
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Bankruptcy Court Judge George Benson eventually consented to
Bailes's release. This, however, could only be accomplished if a fed
eral district court judge would agree to enter an order setting the de
fendant at liberty. The first judge McGough approached, Judge
Charles Richey, agreed to the release on condition that the United
States Attorney's office assent. The United States Attorney was then
preparing a second, much more serious case against Bailes7 and appar
ently would have opposed freeing the prisoner. Rather than accept
this decision or enter negotiations with the United States Attorney's
office, McGough approached a second federal district court judge,
Stanley Harris, concerning the matter. McGough did not inform
Judge Harris of Judge Richey's prior ruling, and Harris issued an or
der releasing Bailes into McGough's custody. Judge Harris rescinded
this order as soon as he learned of the prior, undisclosed Richey rul
ing. Judge Harris was so disturbed by McGough's behavior that he
sought to have her disciplined by the District of Columbia Bar for her
conduct.
In 1988, Bailes was tried in a North Carolina federal court for his
efforts to sell insurance company charters.8 The government's case
proved so strong and Bailes's defense so weak that in midstream he
shifted to an insanity plea. That claim was rejected by the jury, and,
upon conviction, Bailes was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.
In the meantime, a number of those either injured or affronted by
McGough's behavior during her efforts on Bailes's behalf began civil
proceedings against her. The first to proceed was the investment
banker, MacDonald, who had lost $75,000 in the escrow deposit inci
dent in June 1986. He brought suit against McGough in 1987 to re
cover his lost funds. Included as a defendant in this action was the in
surer that had provided McGough with Errors and Omissions
insurance. Shortly before trial, in the fall of 1988, MacDonald settled
with the insurance company, receiving $75,000. One remarkable event
in the civil action was the proffer of apparently forged documents by
the defense immediately before the case was to go to trial. Who had
forged the documents never became clear, but the most likely candi
date was Bailes. Later disclosures, however, suggested that McGough
may have been involved, at least insofar as seeking to get the forgeries
notarized long after their alleged execution date.
In October of 1988, MacDonald took the next step in his campaign
against McGough by seeking her disbarment in Virginia. Other bar
related complaints were then being processed, including that made by
Judge Harris. The United States Attorney's office in Alexandria,
7. This is the case that would be tried in a North Carolina federal court in 1988.
8. See United States v. Bailes, Nos. 88-5172, 88-5674, 1991 U. S. App. LEXIS 12199, at
*1-2 (4th Cir. June 14, 1991).
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Virginia, responded to all this by initiating a grand jury inquiry into
McGough's conduct.
The grand jury proceedings resulted in
McGough's being indicted on fifteen felony charges.
McGough's criminal trial took place in 1990, and addressed
charges related to the withdrawal of funds from her escrow account,
her behavior in the bankruptcy proceedings, and a number of other
matters.9 The federal prosecutor, Mark Hulkower, subpoenaed more
than fifty witnesses for the case (although not all were called to tes
tify). Among those who gave evidence against McGough were four
judges, including federal district court judges Richey and Harris, who
had been entangled in the bankruptcy scheme.
At the heart of the case against McGough was the withdrawal of
the $75,000 MacDonald deposit from her trust account. The "bro
kers "Manfredi and Boccagna, as well as their attorney, Morris, all tes
tified that this withdrawal was in direct violation of their understand
ing with McGough that the funds would be held in escrow until the
two $900,000 deals were consummated. The credibility of these three
witnesses was open to question since each was serving or had served
time in prison, and two (Manfredi and Morris) were disbarred attor
neys. Moreover, as Malcolm notes, but as McGough's defense counsel
failed to observe, the key telephone conversation concerning the es
crow arrangement lasted but one minute - a suspiciously short time
to conduct all the business the government witnesses claimed was
handled. MacDonald appeared for the government and reiterated
many of his charges against McGough. These were amplified upon by
Michael Wyatt, MacDonald's lawyer in the 1987 civil action involving
McGough and her Errors and Omissions insurer. Wyatt described the
events surrounding the proffer of the forged documents on the eve of
the civil trial.
Prosecutor Hulkower's overarching theory was that Sheila
McGough had joined Bailes in a series of illegal scams designed to
benefit both the attorney and her erstwhile client. In the govern
ment's case, however, the motive for McGough's choosing to forsake
the role of honest attorney and join forces with her con man client was
never made entirely clear. There was some evidence (albeit thin) of a
romantic attraction as well as the more prosaic suggestion that the mo
tive might have been greed.
The defense strategy was to attack the credibility of the prosecu
tion's key witnesses and to argue that McGough had done no more
than act as a zealous lawyer on behalf of her client, Bailes. This may

9. See United States v. McGough, No. 91-5511, 1991 U. S. App. LEXIS 28977, at *2 (4th
Cir. Dec. 12, 1991) (charges enumerated by the court of appeals included conspiracy to de
fraud, wire and mail fraud, receiving stolen monies and securities, obstruction of justice, wit
ness intimidation, and perjury).
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not have been a particularly effective defense, but counsel were im
peded from any other choice by McGough's refusal to take the stand
in her own defense or sanction any sustained attack on Bailes. Her
justification for these choices was an assertion that she owed Bailes a
continuing duty of loyalty and confidentiality.10 The defense called a
series of lawyers to testify in an effort to demonstrate that McGough
had acted appropriately in her dealings with Bailes. Among those
who testified was McGough's attorney in the 1987 civil proceedings,
Kenneth Labowitz. He believed that his client had acted honestly.
However, after McGough's criminal conviction, he emphatically as
serted that McGough had shown extremely poor judgment in her rela
tions with Bailes, a con man who Labowitz thought had taken advan
tage of her lack of legal experience, training, and supervision. Three
lawyers who had dealings with Bailes also appeared but were not
asked whether Bailes had ever tried to swindle them or use their of
fices and trust accounts for his schemes. (Several would later tell
Malcolm that Bailes had done so.)
The jury did not buy the defense's arguments and on November
21, 1990, one day before Thanksgiving, convicted McGough on four
teen of the fifteen felony charges. Of the jury's deliberations Malcolm
said: "[T]he jury, evidently needing the afternoon hours for shopping
for cranberries and canned pumpkin, reached its verdict by lunchtime
after six hours of deliberation" (p. 6). Malcolm says that she, after ar
duous investigation, came to share a number of McGough's views re
garding her conviction. McGough set these out in a letter which
stated:
I was a defense lawyer who irritated some federal judges and federal
prosecutors in the course of defending a client. The federal prosecutors
in my hometown [Alexandria, Virginia] investigated me for four years,
and when they failed to tum up anything illegal in what I was doing, they
made up some crimes for me and found people to support them with
false testimony. ... I didn't commit any of the 14 felonies I was convicted
of. The U.S.Government office in Alexandria "framed" me. [p. 6]

Malcolm also has harsh words for McGough's defense counsel and the
legal system:
Her lawyers had evidently not been up to the task. To win their case,
they needed to tell a story at least as compelling as the prosecution's the story, as Hulkower [the prosecutor] neatly summarized it in his
opening statement, "of what happens when an attorney violates the first
rule of criminal defense and crosses the line from representation of the
criminal to participation in his crimes." But no powerful counterstory
was ever told by Kohlman and Rochon [defense counsel]. With their
10. Bailes died in 1995. This led McGough to decide, or at least so she told Malcolm,
that she had been freed from the obligation of confidentiality.
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hands tied by the double bonds of the rules of evidence and the stubborn
silence of their client, they could do little more than rush around putting
out little fires in wastebaskets as the entire building burned to the
ground. [pp.11-12]
In the end, Malcolm concluded that McGough was an "exquisite
heroine" (p. 161), "a woman of almost preternatural honesty and de
cency" (p. 6), who through "the heedless selflessness that propelled
her downfall has thrown into relief the radicalism of her vision of de
fense law as a calling for the incorrigibly loyal" (p. 161).

II. SHOULD WE BELIEVE MALCOLM'S VERSION?
There are a number of reasons not to accept Janet Malcolm's re
construction and interpretation of Sheila McGough's story. Some are
contained within the story itself while others are highlighted in Judge
Richard Posner's assessment of Malcolm's book in a review published
in The New Republic in April of last year.11 The most serious charge
leveled by Malcolm is that the government "framed" Sheila
McGough. It is not exactly clear what this means, but Malcolm herself
appears to reject the charge by declaring:
Sheila has never been able to demonstrate to me that Hulkower and his
boss, Henry Hudson, knew she was innocent and prosecuted her all the
same. "I can't prove it yet," she wrote in 1996, and she hasn't proved it
two years later. While it seems clear to me that Morris and Manfredi and
Boccagna testified falsely when they said that Sheila told them she would
hold the money in escrow, it isn't at all clear that Hulkower knew this
and was cynically supporting a theory he didn't believe in. I think he be
lieved Sheila was Bailes's gun moll and had lied and cheated on his be
half. He had never met Sheila - he didn't know what I know about her
character. He professed to find my defense of her pitiful. [p. 110]

With that charge out of the way, two assertions remain: first, that
McGough was "almost preternaturally honest"; and second, that the
explanation for her conduct was her selfless loyalty to her client.
As to the claim about McGough's honesty, the record Malcolm
sets out is not completely convincing. Although Malcolm is fully satis
fied on the point, she does discuss at least one instance which draws
McGough's candor into question. That incident involved a man
named Fred Quarles, who had made inquiries about purchasing one of
Bailes's infamous insurance company charters. Quarles had pursued
the matter for some time and, as part of his inquiries, eventually asked
McGough where Bailes was. The question came shortly after Bailes
had been imprisoned pursuant to the 1986 Virginia bank fraud convic
tion. Apparently to protect the prospects of a deal and/or the reputa11. See Posner, supra note 4.
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tion of a client, McGough lied about Bailes's situation. As she put it
when Malcolm confronted her about the matter:

"Quarles told the truth. I did mislead him," Sheila said.
"What did you say!"
"Yes, I told Quarles that nothing was final, that things were on appeal.
That wasn't truthful. I did try to mislead him. All I can say in my de
fense is that I didn't want to give out damaging information about a cli
ent without his permission. A more experienced attorney would have
found a better way of doing this. I didn't do it well. He took me by sur
prise, and instead of a generic, lawyerlike answer like, 'Oh, I don't ever
give out information about a client,' I misled him. I wasn't under oath.
It wasn't illegal. But I should have done it differently." [p. 129]
This anecdote suggests that truth was no real obstacle when
Bailes's (and perhaps McGough's) interests were at stake. Despite
this evidence, Malcolm chose to cling tenaciously to her belief that
McGough was extraordinarily honest. Her spin on the Quarles matter
is revealing, if unpersuasive. Malcolm says of the incident: "Her con
fession to me that she had misled Quarles was only further evidence of
her honesty. She could have fudged or equivocated, but she had cho
sen to tell the shameful truth about herself" (p. 130). Confession may
be good for the soul, but it is not proof of thoroughgoing honesty.
This seems a weak defense and one that is strained beyond the
breaking point when reconsidered in light of Judge Posner's disclo
sures, to be considered below.
What remains of Malcolm's claims is the assertion that McGough
was guided in her actions by a selfless loyalty to her client, Bob Bailes.
It is true that McGough seems, in Malcolm's telling of the story, ex
traordinarily, even self-sacrificingly, loyal. Yet much of what Malcolm
describes as noble loyalty may equally well be described as muddle
headedness or downright stupidity. McGough took every opportunity
to help her client sell his plainly suspect insurance charters, manipu
late the system to escape confinement, and achieve a number of other
self-serving ends. She let him pursue his dubious business out of her
office and use her trust account without constraint or review. She told
misleading stories on his behalf and did whatever seemed necessary to
get the bankruptcy scheme to work. At a minimum, her conduct was
careless and irresponsible. Even Malcolm is forced to concede: "It
seems unbelievable that someone who had a law degree could be so
credulous and so careless" (p. 25). Indeed, it does seem unbelievable.
None of the numerous attorneys Malcolm questioned thought
McGough had acted sensibly.
Labowitz, her civil counsel, said
McGough's "judgment appeared to be flawed. It is inexplicable to me
what she was hoping to accomplish when she took some of the actions
she took on behalf of Mr. Bailes" (p. 73). He concluded that the es
crow transaction, in particular, was handled in a thoroughly unprofes-
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sional way. One of her criminal defense lawyers, Gary Kohlman,
thought that McGough had performed services for her client "that
started stretching the boundaries - or perhaps went beyond the
boundaries" (p. 112). Her other criminal counsel, Mark Rochon, said:
"What did she do? She simply followed the directions of that idiot
[Bailes]. She lacked common sense. She was brand-new out of law
school, with no supporting network of lawyers to temper her judg
ment" (p. 123). William Sheffield, an attorney whom Bailes had tried
to manipulate in precisely the same way as he did McGough, barred
Bailes from wiring funds into his trust account and confronted Bailes
when he disregarded Sheffield's instructions.
Sheila McGough's failure to control Bailes and her advocacy on his
behalf seem far more like gullible na'ivete than noble self-sacrifice. It
harmed not only McGough, but a number of others who had dealings
with Bailes. The record Malcolm advances fairly shouts this conclu
sion. Moreover, when anyone other than McGough is single-mindedly
or dogmatically devoted to an objective, Malcolm is immediately sus
picious. This was certainly the case with respect to Malcolm's assess
ment of the investment banker MacDonald. His long and unrelenting
pursuit of McGough is presented as questionable, and he is, through
out Malcolm's book cast in an unflattering light. His passion for re
venge or justice (depending on how one looks at it) seems far less ob
jectionable and dangerous than McGough's zeal on Bailes's behalf.
Malcolm, perhaps inadvertently, provides a number of alternatives
rather than noble zeal, to explain McGough's actions. One of the
most intriguing is that McGough undertook her efforts on Bailes's be
half out of a sense of guilt at having botched his defense in the
Virginia bank fraud case. As McGough herself put it:

"Where I blundered was to take on legal matters I wasn't prepared for,"
she said. "I should have just said no. It was an error of pride. I was flat
tered by Bobby's trust in me. But I didn't have the proper experience,
and I didn't represent him adequately." [p. 40]
Another possibility is that McGough, because of her na'ivete and inex
perience, was conned again and again by the artful Bailes. All of her
counsel, both civil and criminal, appeared to subscribe to this notion,
and it is amply supported by the reports of lawyers who, through bitter
experience, were acquainted with Bob Bailes's modus operandi. Al
ternatively, or in addition, McGough seemed to be experiencing se
vere mental distress during this period.12 Her civil counsel, Kenneth
Labowitz, said of his client during the run up to the 1987 civil trial:
"She was coming apart at the time of the civil case. I mean, emotion
ally. It was unpleasant to watch" (p. 73). There is good reason to sus-

12. I would like to thank my wife, Janice Toran, for bringing this point to my attention.
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pect that her choices in relation to Bailes's affairs were the product of
emotional pressures that deprived her of sound judgment.
Judge Richard Posner has written a lengthy review of The Crime of
Sheila McGough.13 As a part of his assessment of the book, he under
took an independent examination of the record in McGough's case.
What he reports having found in that record raises additional ques
tions about McGough's honesty and Janet Malcolm's interpretation of
the case. Posner concludes that "the evidence taken as a whole leaves
little doubt of McGough's guilt,"14 and that Malcolm's description of it
should, most fairly, be described as "fiction" rather than reportage.15
Posner notes a substantial number of instances of McGough's un
truthfulness or fraud - instances not reported by Malcolm. Among
these is the fact that MacDonald's lawyer in the original charter deal, a
man named Blazzard, testified at McGough's trial that two weeks after
the $75,000 was wired into McGough's trust account, he spoke with
her and she assured him that the money was still being held in escrow
in the account.16 Blazzard's testimony appears to provide independent
evidence, by a credible source, of McGough's dishonesty regarding the
escrow arrangement. Charges of dishonesty are reinforced, according
to Posner, by McGough's denial during pretrial depositions in the
MacDonald civil suit "that she had represented Bailes in connection
with the sale of the insurance charters."17 Posner also notes that
MacDonald's $75,000 was not the only deposit removed by McGough
from her trust account and divvied up with Bailes during the course of
the insurance charter scam. Two $25,000 deposits, one paid by a man
named Johnson, and the other by two investors named Invin and Sali,
were both removed from the account and shared out between
McGough and Bailes. In both cases the depositors said they had been
assured that the funds would be held in escrow until various charter
deals were concluded.
When Sali sought return of his deposit,
"McGough threatened to sue him and to have him arrested."18
Posner also focuses on McGough's exceedingly troubling behavior
during what he calls the "fantastic scheme"19 to free Bailes by means
of a bankruptcy proceeding. As he puts it: "McGough not only pre
pared numerous pleadings and motions in these fraudulent proceed
ings, but also procured and paid lawyers to represent the sham credi-

13. See Posner, supra note 4.
14. Id. at 32.
15. Id. at 34.
16. See id. at 29-30.
17. Id. at 30.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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tors."20 Judge Posner's assessment of the record raises profound ques
tions about whether we should accept Malcolm's description of the
matter. It seems far more likely than not that the prosecution and jury
got the case right.
III.

THE M ORAL ACCORDING TO MALCOLM

Malcolm sees McGough21 as a paradigmatic case - one that can
yield an enormous number of lessons. Malcolm's central concern is
with the impact of narrative on courtroom adjudication. What courts
and juries do, according to Malcolm, is hear and weigh competing nar
ratives. The most convincing story is the one that wins. Malcolm sees
this as profoundly dangerous because the best narrative is not neces
sarily the truth. The problem starts with language itself, "which pro
scribes unregulated truth-telling and requires that our utterances tell
coherent, and thus never merely true, stories" (p. 4). While in most
situations "the line between narration and lying is a pretty clear one"
(p. 4), that is not necessarily the case in trials. The rules of evidence
and the manipulations of adversarial lawyers blur the factual outline,
inhibit the flow of information, and leave the decision.maker vulner
able to the lure of too neat a tale. These problems are exacerbated by
the fact that virtually every witness suffers those small lapses of mem
ory and takes those verbal shortcuts that will make him or her vulner
able to a lawyer's cross-examination and accusations of untruthfulness.
The reconstruction that takes place in the courtroom is more "like
ruins than proper buildings; there is never enough solid building mate
rial and always too much dust" (p. 19). Malcolm's sense is that law
yers see truth as "a nuisance" (p. 26). This is particularly the case be
cause "truth does not make a good story" (p. 26), and lawyers are
constantly striving to fabricate the "good story," one that will win the
case. In the end, what helps is used and what is problematic is dis
carded. Out of this winnowing process, the lawyers shape and fashion
their narratives: "Trials are won by attorneys whose stories fit, and
lost by those whose stories are like the shapeless housecoat that truth,
in her disdain of appearances, has chosen as her uniform" (p. 67). For
Malcolm, McGough's case is an archetypical example of all this - the
prosecution's story fit. The tale of a renegade lawyer who crossed the
line was more attractive than the defense's hobbled contentions about
loyalty, although Malcolm was convinced that the latter was indeed
true.

20. Id.
21. See United States v. McGough, No. 91-5511, 1991 U. S. App. LEXIS 28977, at * 2 (4th
Cir. Dec. 12, 1991).
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The implications, according to Malcolm, are dire: "Law stories are
empty stories. They take the reader to a world entirely constructed of
tendentious argument, and utterly devoid of the truth of the real world,
where things are allowed to fall as they may" (pp. 78-79; emphases
added). In this view, biased argument rules over the facts. There is no
chance for factually based assessment, and the lawyers' reconstruc
tions blot out the underlying reality. The jury is left guessing. One
would think that these conclusions damn the system beyond any hope
of redemption, yet Malcolm is, at least slightly, more circumspect:
The method of adversarial law is to pit two trained palterers against each
other. The jury is asked to guess not which side is telling the truth - it
knows that neither is - but which side is being untruthful in aid of the
truth. No one has thought of a better system, but everyone who has par
ticipated in it - whether as defendant, defense lawyer, plaintiff, plain
tiff's lawyer, prosecutor, judge, or juror - has gained a sense of its cyni
cism and absurdism. [p. 79]

These are weighty charges. It is hard to know what to make of the ca
veat "no one has thought of a better system," but implicit in Malcolm's
argument would seem to be the suggestion that any procedure which
leaves participants with a sense that the process is a cynical hoax and
essentially absurd cannot be one that is likely to endure.
Malcolm draws several further lessons from her examination of
McGough's case. She sees in McGough's story a set of insights about
lawyers. The key to legal success is the ability to tell a good story, and
those who can best manipulate the evidence triumph. Such is the case
with McGough's prosecutor, Mark Hulkower. When faced with fac
tual inconsistencies, he simply designed an effective cover story: "[I]n
[his] capable hands ... the narrative beautifully held. Hulkower sim
ply wouldn't allow the inconsistencies to impede the progress of his
story" (p. 24). The silver-tongued advocate, something of a stock
character, triumphs and dooms his less talented opponents to defeat.
In this world, the merits are of little importance, and the lawyer's cun
ning is all that really counts - a cynical insight, indeed!
Lawyers are not only amoral mouthpieces, they are self-serving as
well. Lawyers "will do almost anything to stay in [judges'] favor" (p.
112). One sees this most clearly, according to Malcolm, at side-bar
conferences. In remarks apparently adapted from her own brief essay
in a book based on a Yale Law School symposium,22 Malcolm says that
at sidebars "lawyers drop their masks of antagonism and behave like
schoolboys in front of the teacher, vying ... to impress her" (p. 113).
This sycophancy signals a deep disloyalty to or, as Malcolm puts it,
22. See Janet Malcolm, The Side-Bar Conference, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 106 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) [hereinafter LAW'S
STORIES].
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betrayal of the client. For most lawyers, unlike McGough, self
preservation and advancement are placed far ahead of loyalty to or
zeal on behalf of a client. All of McGough's lawyers are accused of
betrayal. Labowitz, her civil lawyer, takes Malcolm "aback by the
coldness" of his remarks about his client (p. 72). Malcolm says: "I had
expected the posture of loyalty to hold a bit better than this" (p. 72).
Kohlman and Rochon, McGough's criminal defense counsel, fare no
better. Kohlman suggests to Malcolm that McGough may have trans
gressed the boundary of propriety in her efforts on Bailes's behalf. In
this suggestion, Malcolm sees Kohlman straying "across the line, sepa
rating loyalty tempered by honesty from careless betrayal" (p. 112).
Rochon, too, "subtly undermined Sheila" in his remarks to Malcolm
and, hence, joined Kohlman in the ranks of betrayers. As Malcolm
sees it, in a system dedicated to dissembling narratives, it is not sur
prising to find lawyers who pay no more than lip service to their cli
ents.
Malcolm's third major target is the jury. McGough's jury is de
picted as shamefully uninterested in getting at the truth in the case be
fore them. After six hours of deliberations, at least part of which were
held on the day before Thanksgiving, they decided to convict on four
teen of the fifteen charges. Malcolm suggests (without any cited evi
dence) that their motivation for deciding was a desire to get on with
holiday grocery shopping. She later suggests that the same jurors
(again without any articulated proof) disregarded the testimony of a
particular black defense witness because they were an "all-white
Alexandria [Virginia] jury" and that similar "testimony might have
impressed a New York jury" (p. 36). All of this is consistent with
Malcolm's vision of the jury system in general. Late in her book, she
writes:

The jury system is posited on the idea that people are capable of sus
pending their normal state of having a fixed opinion about everything
and allowing new ideas to penetrate the defenses of their old ones. But
this is like believing people capable of suspending the peristaltic motion
of their stomachs. It is like imagining a ballpark filled with placidly neu
tral spectators. Every juror listens to the testimony through the filter of
his preconceptions and as a (conscious or unconscious) rooter for one
side or the other. The recognition of this actuality is what gives jury se
lection its tense atmosphere and has, in our culture of store-bought horse
sense, created an industry of experts on jury selection, to whom each side
now runs for help whenever it can afford to do so. [p. 131]
In the end, Malcolm constructs, out of her reading of McGough's case,
a devastating portrait of the justice system: beguiled by stories, misled
by lawyers, and in the hands of dogmatically closed-minded jurors.
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IV. DOES MALCOLM GET IT RIGHT?
Malcolm's work does touch a nerve. Ours is a time seemingly pre
occupied with the idea of narrative. The importance of stories to cases
has even been remarked on by the United States Supreme Court. In
the 1997 decision, Old Chief v. United States,23 Justice Souter, writing
for a closely divided court, emphasized the importance of judicial rec
ognition "of the offering party's need for evidentiary richness and nar
rative integrity in presenting a case."42 The lawyers on each side of a
criminal case are, according to the Court, entitled to tell their stories,
more or less, in their own way. Their evidentiary offerings are to be
treated as having a "force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning. "25
The natural and appropriate result of each lawyer's storytelling is that
"as its pieces come together, a narrative gains momentum, with power
not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors
to draw the inferences . . . necessary to reach an honest verdict. "62 The
prosecution's obligation in criminal cases transcends a syllogistic pres
entation to encompass the telling of "a story of guiltiness."72
All of this seems to verify Malcolm's charge that the law cares
more for stories than for truth. Yet, Old Chief is not a case empow
ering lawyers as storytellers, but one imposing limits on the scope of
storytelling.
The Court bars the prosecution's introduction of a
somewhat detailed description of the defendant's prior conviction and
insists on the use of a defense-proffered stipulation in its place. 28 This
was done to avoid prejudice and discourage jurors from formulating
too potent a story regarding the defendant's past.
Malcolm uses the story of Sheila McGough to indict storytelling in
the courtroom. In the burgeoning literature on storytelling, there has
been a robust debate about the merits of attacking the legal system by
means of stories. 29 One needs to search no further than the dispute
about the story of Stella Liebeck's injury after dousing herself with an
extremely hot cup of coffee purchased at McDonald's,30 to glimpse the

23.

519 U. S. 172 (1997).

24.

Old Chief,

25.

Id.

26.

Id.

27.

Id.

519 U. S. at 183.

at 187.
at 188.

28. See id. at 190·92.
29. For discussion of the dangers of this sort of storytelling, see, for example, STEPHEN
DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLmCS OF REFORM 37-46 (1995),
and Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
30. See Andrea Gerlin, How a Jury Decided that a
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at Al.

Coffee Spill ls Worth

$2.9 Million,
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nature of the problem. The story of Liebeck's suit and the jury's
award of $2.9 million has been used as "exhibit A" by tort reformers
seeking to revamp personal injury law.31 Careful examination of the
case, however, suggests that the matter is far from simple. It would
appear that McDonald's may have handled the problem of coffee
burns in a high-handed manner, disregarded a substantial risk to its
customers, and been particularly unpleasant in its dealings with the 81year-old, badly burned Liebeck.32 In the end, the Liebeck story does
not shed an enormous amount of light on the question of tort reform
although it generated a considerable amount of heat.
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry have been particularly trench
ant in their criticism of the use of narratives as a method of attacking
the flaws in the legal system.33 They have concluded "that stories can
distort legal debate, particularly if those stories are atypical, inaccu
rate, or incomplete."34 Malcolm's chosen story seems to pose all these
problems. As Judge Posner has pointed out, there are substantial
questions about the accuracy and completeness of Malcolm's descrip
tion. These are critically important in determining whether McGough
has anything at all to teach us. Assuming that Malcolm's tale may be
relied upon, it remains to be seen whether it is at all typical or repre
sentative. If it is a one-of-a-kind phenomenon, it has very little didac
tic value. A single idiosyncratic anecdote is not proof of anything.
Unfortunately, Malcolm makes no effort to place McGough in any
sort of context or demonstrate its general applicability. It seems as if
she is asking readers to condemn the entire justice system on the
strength of a single court proceeding that has (if we accept Malcolm's
analysis) gone awry. Malcolm provides no proof that McGough is
typical of anything.
Argument by anecdote poses other risks as well. Anecdotes do not
provide a sound basis for understanding: "[S]uch evidence permits
only the loosest and weakest of inferences about matters a field is
trying to understand. Anecdotes do not permit one to determine ei
ther the frequency of occurrence of something or its causes and ef
fects."35 Stories concerning legal misadventure, without more, do not
tell us anything about why things happened the way they did. To as-

31. See, for example, the remarks of Representative Ron Packer in support of proposed
tort reform legislation, in CONG. REC. E548 (Mar. 8, 1995).
32

See Gerlin, supra note 30.

33.

See Farber & Sherry, supra note 29; Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Legal Story
telling and Constitutional Law: The Medium and the Message, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note
22, at 37 [hereinafter Farber & Sherry, Legal Storytelling].

34. Farber & Sherry, Legal Storytelling, supra note 33, at 38.
35. Michael Saks, Do

We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litiga
tion System-And Why Not?, 140U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1159 (1992).
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sume that the system is at fault - or, in the McGough case, to con
clude that narrativity and evidence rules did an "exquisite heroine " in
- is not justified. Moreover, anecdotes like McGough tend to cut off
discourse. They do not develop rational or detailed proof but a pre
packaged story. Such stories are hard to challenge, especially because
of their sympathetic nature and emotional appeal. Affecting stories
tend to hide the complexity of events and clothe important questions
in distracting emotional garb.6
3 The lamentable image of McGough
languishing in prison tends to obscure the harder questions raised by
Malcolm's book.
These criticisms of Malcolm's anecdotalization of the McGough
trial might be read to suggest that when the legal system itself places
reliance on stories, narratives, or anecdotes at trial, it courts disaster.
The answer to this argument requires an assessment of precisely how
adjudicators use narratives and how narratives interact with the un
derlying facts of a case. Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie argue that
jurors decide the complex questions posed in lawsuits by fashioning
narratives.37 According to this theory, jurors construct a "causal
model, " or narrative, to explain the available proof. This model is
then matched with the decision options made available through legal
instructions. The best match forms the basis for decision. It is impor
tant to note, however, that the causal model, or narrative, is not fabri
cated independently of the proof but, rather, premised upon it. The
process of narrative formulation is not the product of the lawyers' ef
forts but a construction undertaken by each juror. The construction is
a synthetical process that has regard for the evidence and legal rules as
well as for prior juror experience. Once each juror has fashioned a
narrative, he or she is required to harmonize it with the similar efforts
of all the other jurors. No individual's story dictates the outcome.
The question remains whether jurors pay adequate attention to the
facts presented to them. While there is no surefire way to answer this
question, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeise!, in their seminal work The
American Jury, concluded that "the jury by and large does understand
the case and get it straight, and ... the evidence itself is a major de
terminant of the decision."38 Moreover, in almost four cases out of
every five studied, judge and jury independently came to the same
verdict - a rate of agreement superior to that of professionals facing a

36. For an analysis of the same problem in a slightly different setting, see Anne M.
Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholars/zip, 81
VA. L. REV. 1229 {1995).
37. The remainder of this paragraph is based upon Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519
{1991).

Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model,

38. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEI SEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 162 (1966).
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range of other decisional tasks.39 Based on these findings, as well as on
subsequent research, a number of prominent social scientists have
concluded that the weight and directionality of evidence are the pre
ponderant determinants of jury verdicts. As Richard Lempert puts it:
"A considerable body of research indicates that even when aspects of
a case might appeal to the prejudices of jurors, unless the case is oth
erwise close on the facts, the evidence dominates."40 Lempert cites a
study by Christie Visher supporting this proposition.41 Visher, in tum,
cites several more to the same effect.42 These conclusions are reiter
ated by Michael Saks who states: "Studies that have pitted trial evi
dence and arguments against what jurors bring with them to court
usually find that the trial information carries far more weight."43
Similarly, Shari Diamond concludes: "In studies that have measured
the contributions of juror characteristics and trial testimony to jury
verdicts, the trial testimony dominates."44 In the end, the empirical re
search suggests that evidence is key and that narrative construction is
driven by it. While it is a leap from these observations to concluding
that jurors find the truth, we have solid evidence for joining with
Aristotle in arguing: "things that are true and things that are just have
a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites."45
Several of Malcolm's charges remain to be considered, including
two against lawyers: first, that they are silver-tongued tricksters who,
by twisting the evidence get their way; and second, that they generally
betray their clients. As to the first, the above-cited social science ma
terials indicate very serious limits on the power of lawyers to affect
outcomes. This question was one that Kalven and Zeisel attempted to
assess. Their key findings are that counsel have only an extremely
modest impact on decisions and that lawyers are evenly matched more
than three-quarters of the time.46 In light of these findings, Malcolm's

39. See Shari S. Diamond, Order in the Court: Consistency in Criminal-Court Decisions,
THE M ASTER LECTURE SERIES, VOLUME II: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 123, 125 tbl.1
(C.T. Scheiner & B.L. Hammonds, eds. 1983).

in

40. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases:
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).

Taking Stock after Twelve Years,

in VERDICT 181, 218

41. See Christie A. Visher, Juror
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1987).
42

See id.

Decision Making:

The Importance of Evidence,

at 5-6.

43. Michael Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. l, 18 (1997).
44.

11

Shari S. Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection:
178, 182 (1990).

(Should) Make

What Social Scientists Know and Do Not

Know, 73 JUDICATURE

45. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC l.1.1355a22-35, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
(rev. Oxford trans. Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984), quoted in Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, ls
Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 146 (1997).
46.

See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 38,

at 354-55.
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attribution of particular persuasive power to the prosecutor with a
brilliant narrative approach must be treated with a good deal of skep
ticism, at least as an indictment of the entire justice system.
The accusation regarding betrayal is far harder to deal with as it is
intimately bound up with our reactions to Sheila McGough's story. If
McGough is a shining paragon of loyalty, then her story stands as a se
rious accusation against a legal profession that cannot recognize no
bility or abide devotion. If, on the other hand, McGough is little more
than an emotionally troubled and inexperienced lawyer who made
grievous mistakes in attempting to help a conniving client, then there
is little need to defend McGough's lawyers or the system of which they
are a part. The betrayal/loyalty question, however, has a larger di
mension.
Modem criminal defense lawyers confront the dilemma of loyalty
on a regular basis. Defense counsel are expected to act with warm
zeal on behalf of their clients,47 to render them loyal service,48 and to
guard client confidences.49 Yet, the criminal law regarding accessories
"forbids a lawyer from intentionally assisting a client in committing a
crime."50 What this restriction means is a hotly disputed question.
Some take it to mean that criminal liability can be triggered if a lawyer
ignores her suspicions or consciously seeks to avoid the truth about a
client.51 Others challenge this view as too restrictive.52 Even if one
embraces a less restrictive interpretation of the law on accessories, the
lawyer's representation, counseling, and drafting can all result in
criminal charges if undertaken with the goal of advancing a criminal
objective. Charges of this nature have been made by the government
in a series of high profile cases including those of several Miami law
yers defending members of the Cali drug cartel53 and of a New York
lawyer working on behalf of a prominent member of the Gambino

47. See MODELCODEOF PROFESSIONALREsPONSIBI LITY Canon 7 (1980) ("[A] lawyer
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983) ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client.").
48. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONALCONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 1 {1983) ("Loyalty is
an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client.").
49. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBI LITY DR 4-101 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not reveal infor
mation relating to the representation of a client . . . . ") .
50. Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327,
355 (1998). The argument in the remainder of this paragraph is based primarily on Green's
persuasive analysis.
51.

See, e.g., United States v. Wilson,

52

See generally Green, supra note 50.

53.

See Mireya Navarro, Lawyers Weigh Effect of Conviction of Missing Colleague,
1998, § 1, at 24, cited in Green, supra note 50.

TIMES, Aug. 9,

134 F.3d 855, 868 (7th Cir. 1998).
N.Y.
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crime family.54 There are no easy answers in this area. Wisdom coun
sels restraint before the criminal law is used to discipline lawyers for
what they perceive as zealous representation, but lawyers are not free
to ride roughshod. There are limits beyond which loyalty may not be
pressed. Respect for those limits is not a matter of betrayal but of ne
cessity in any system premised upon the rule of law rather than indi
vidual whim.

V. WHY MIGHT MALCOLM HAVE SEEN IT AS SHE DID?
It is not easy to determine why Malcolm interpreted McGough's
case as she did. One might begin by noting that McGough, like
Malcolm, was a middle-aged woman struggling to make her way in a
sometimes hostile profession. This similarity of situation was likely to
have generated some sympathy on Malcolm's part for her subject. Of
potentially greater importance are two significant events in Malcolm's
life that may have colored her reaction to McGough's story when she
became aware of it in the winter of 1996. The first of these was the
resolution in that year, after more than a decade of litigation, of a libel
suit filed by psychoanalyst Jeffrey Masson against Malcolm and her
employer, The New Yorker magazine. The other was Malcolm's par
ticipation in February 1995 in a Yale Law School symposium entitled
"Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law."55
The Masson lawsuit was a bitter and protracted affair that arose
out of The New Yorker's publication in December 1983 of a two-part
article entitled "In the Freud Archives."56 This piece presented a
scathing portrait of Jeffrey Masson, a man who had meteorically risen
to the prominent position of Projects Director of the Freud Archives
only to be ousted when he advanced the claim that Freud's work was
fatally flawed because of the master's cowardly abandonment of the
"seduction theory," which hypothesized that many psychiatric patients
were the victims of childhood sexual abuse.57 Masson had been exten
sively interviewed by Malcolm in preparation for the writing of the ar
ticle. These interviews had generated more than 1,000 pages of tran
script and notes.58 Masson sued after the publication of the piece,
claiming that it "falsely portrayed him as egotistical, vain, and lacking

54. SeeUnited States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1993) (charge that lawyer
was criminal co-conspirator used to disqualify him as counsel).
55.

See

LAW'S STORIES, supra note 22, at vii.

56. The basic facts of the commencement and early stages of the lawsuit are recited in
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
57. For discussion of the seduction theory issue, see Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
895 F.2d 1535, 1536 (9th Cir. 1989).

Inc.,

58.

See Masson, 686 F. Supp.

at 1397.
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in personal honesty and moral integrity."59 After a good deal of pre
liminary legal skirmishing, Judge Lynch of the federal district court for
the Northern District of California granted Malcolm's motion for
summary judgment in August of 1987.60 The judge did so despite
finding that Malcolm had been involved in the "fictionalization or
dramatization of conversations"61 presented as direct quotations in
The New Yorker article.
Masson appealed this ruling to the Ninth Circuit which, in 1989, af
firmed the district court's summary judgment by a two-to-one vote.62
The majority noted that quotes had been fabricated or altered but
concluded that "[a]n author may . . . under certain circumstances, fic
tionalize quotations 'to some extent.' "63 In a sharply worded and
lengthy dissent, Circuit Judge Kozinski challenged the assertion that
material presented in quotation marks can be freely fabricated. "As I
see it," opined Kozinski, "when a writer uses quotation marks in re
porting what someone else has said, she is representing that those are
the speaker's own words or something very close to them."64 Accord
ing to Judge Kozinski, quotations are not fair game for fictionalization
or alteration. Such manipulation breaches oft-repeated journalistic
principles. In support of his argument, Kozinski referred to a 1984
scandal in which a writer for The New Yorker, Alistair Reed, had ad
mitted that he "regularly used composite characters, nonexistent set
tings, and invented dialogue in what were purported to be nonfiction
articles."65 This admission set off a firestorm of criticism from some of
journalism's leading practitioners, including The New York Times, the
Atlantic magazine, Time magazine, the Los Angeles Times, and a host
of others.66 The outcry eventually led the long-time editor of The New
Yorker, William Shawn, to backtrack from his support for Reed and
declare:

We do not permit composites.
We do not rearrange events.
We do not create conversations.61

59.

Id.

60.

See generally Masson,

61.

Id.

62

See Masson, 895 F.2d

63.

Id.

64.

Id. at

686 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1987).

at 1398.
1535 (9th Cir. 1989).

at 1539 (citations omitted).
1548 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

at 1560 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

65.

Id.

66.

See id.

67.

Id.

at 1561 (Kozinski, J., dissenting, emphasis in original).
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By tying Malcolm to this embarrassing episode and to another in
volving a reporter named Janet Cooke, whose fabrications led her to
have to surrender a Pulitzer Prize,68 Kozinski had delivered several
stinging blows. He underscored them by observing, "[t]he circumstan
tial evidence that defendant Janet Malcolm acted with malice, deliber
ately or recklessly altering Masson's statements, is very strong in
deed."69
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in June

1991, reversed the decision of the two lower courts.70 Justice Kennedy,
writing for a seven-member majority,71 embraced Judge Kozinski's
analysis. The Court held that quotation marks are not to be trifled
with, and that evidence presented by Masson regarding a half dozen
article passages suggested the possibility that Malcolm had libelously
falsified the plaintiff's words. This ruling made front page headlines
and exposed both Malcolm and The New Yorker to further humiliat
ing public criticism. The case was returned to the district court where,
in May 1993, a jury found that Malcolm had libeled Masson but could
not agree on an appropriate damage award.72 Judge Lynch granted
Malcolm's motion for a new trial, which was held in October of 1994.
At the second trial a new jury exonerated Malcolm. The second jury
verdict was appealed to the Ninth Circuit which affirmed the jury's de
cision in June 1996, thus ending the case.73
This prolonged legal battle must have been both embarrassing and
wearing for Malcolm. The only real hero, from Malcolm's point of
view, would have been the stalwart district court judge who, through
more than a decade, steered the case to the result he had early on con
cluded was warranted on the merits. Both appellate judges and juries
must have appeared fickle from Malcolm's perspective. In light of this
grueling and all-too-public experience, it would not be surprising if
Malcolm were attracted to a version of McGough's story that empha
sized jury incompetence, lawyer perfidy, legal ineptitude, and the
cynical conclusion that the litigation process is absurd. The only
"hero" in Malcolm's case was Judge Lynch, and it is remarkable how
gently Malcolm treats virtually every trial judge connected to the
McGough story, even those who testified against her at her criminal

68.

See id. at 1561 n.15

(Kozinski, J., dissenting).

69.

Id. at 1566 (Kozinski,

70.

See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S.

J., dissenting).
496 (1991 ).

71. Justices White and Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part, calling for an even
stricter standard with respect to the use of quotations. See Masson, 501 U.S. at 525-28.
72. The history of the case subsequent to the Supreme Court's ruling is set forth in
F.3d 1394 (9thCir. 1996).

Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 85

73.

See id.
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Malcolm's experience may help explain why she saw the

McGough case the way she did.
The one remaining piece of Malcolm's work that seems to call for
explanation is its particular emphasis on the baleful effect of narrative.
At least some of this may be traced to Malcolm's participation in the
1995 Yale conference. The papers presented at that meeting were ed
ited into a book entitled Law's Stories,14 which was published by the
Yale University Press in 1996. Of that book, the seemingly ubiquitous
Judge Posner has written:

Remarkably, considering that the book is intended to showcase this new
movement that I am calling legal narratology, the overall tone of Law's
Stories is skeptical and critical, even defensive. Criticisms and expres
sions of doubt outweigh praise and claims of insight, and the criticisms
are more convincing than the praise.75
It should come as no surprise that out of this critical assessment of
narrative, Malcolm might have formulated a rather jaundiced view of
courtroom storytelling. When the McGough case came along, it may
have seemed custom-made to challenge legal narrative because of the
prosecution's smooth presentation and the defendant's refusal to al
low a neat story to be told on her behalf.
In a brief essay in Law's Stories, Malcolm set out to analyze side
bar conferences. As in her book on McGough, she notes a feeling of
"betrayal" as each lawyer's "mask suddenly dropped"76 during the
side-bar. Curiously, however, her overarching view of the system ap
pears more benign in the Yale piece. She praises the side-bar declar
ing:

But in relegating to a private place the trial antagonists' negotiations
over the limits of storytelling - over the containment of hating and
blaming within crisp rules of procedure (the rules of fair play) - the law
restores something of what it has taken. By so clearly denoting what is
backstage and what is onstage, by keeping the illusion-destroying activi
ties of backstage firmly hidden, the law, with a kind of moving clumsi
ness, signals its acknowledgment of a possibly higher power than its own:
the power of the imagination.77
By the time Malcolm reached the end of her work on Sheila
McGough's case, she appears to have lost her respect for trials, narra
tives, and "the power of imagination." Her disillusionment is to be re
gretted. Its basis is somewhat mysterious. Its consequence, however,
is the prejudicing of a canny observer who has, in the past, helped us

74.

See Malcolm, supra note 22.

75. Richard Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 742 (1997).
76.

See Malcolm, supra note 22, at 108.

77.

Id. at 109.
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scrutinize with the greatest care the way we have told stories about
poets, murderers, journalists, and psychoanalysts.
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